

INDEED

Evidence - Based Model for Evaluation of
Radicalisation Prevention and Mitigation

Deliverable 2.6

D2.6 Baseline Report of Gaps, Needs and Solutions

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Abstract:

This deliverable is a synthesis of the data gathered in WP2 [T2.2] and the academic research carried out in WP1. The deliverable maps out key **challenges** and **opportunities** identified in the research for the next generation of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) and De-radicalisation and other security threat preventive initiatives e.g., policies and strategies, long-term programmes, short-term actions, and ad hoc interventions implemented by the consortium partners and external practitioners and policy makers. D2.6 provides the operational/ practical **input** and **basis** for the development and design of the Evidence-based Evaluation Model (EBEM) for radicalisation prevention and mitigation, the development of e-Guidebook on designing, planning, and implementing evidence-based practice (WP3), and the training materials (WP5).





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List of Acronyms

Acronym	Definition
INDEED	Strengthening a comprehensive approach to prevent and counteract radicalisation based on a universal evidence-based model for evaluation of radicalisation prevention and mitigation
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
PVE	Preventing Violent Extremism
EBEM	Evidence-Based Evaluation Model
EBE	Evidence-Based Evaluation
EBP	Evidence-Based Practice
EU	European Union
LEA	Law Enforcement Agency
PU	Public



R

Report

SMART

Stakeholder Multisectoral Anti-Radicalisation Team

WP

Work Package



1 INDEED PROJECT OVERVIEW

INDEED aims to strengthen the knowledge, capabilities and skills of PVE/CVE and De-radicalisation first-line practitioners and policy makers in designing, planning, implementation and in evaluating initiatives¹ in the field, based on evidence-based approach. INDEED builds from the state-of-the-art, utilising the scientific and practical strengths of recent activities – enhancing them with complementary features to drive advancements and curb a growing rise of radical views and violent behaviour threatening security.

The INDEED methodological framework is based on the '5I' approach i.e., 5 project phases: Identify; Involve; Innovate; Implement; Impact. At the core of INDEED's work methodology is an interdisciplinary and participatory approach, which includes the co-creation of individual project phases and implementing them with the close engagement of multi-sectoral stakeholders. The creation of SMART Hubs (Stakeholder Multisectoral Anti-Radicalisation Teams) as part of INDEED is intended to facilitate this process.

The selected results of the project are:

1. The Universal Evidence-Based Evaluation Model (EBEM) for evaluation of radicalisation prevention and mitigation.
2. A practical EBEM-based Evaluation Tool.
3. A collection of user-friendly repositories (repositories of radicalisation factors and pathways into radicalisation; factors strengthening resilience to radicalisation, repositories of evidence-based practices) for practical use by practitioners and policy makers.
4. Targeted curricula and trainings (offline/ online).
5. Lessons Learnt and Policy recommendations.

All results will be integrated and openly accessible in the INDEED multilingual Toolkit for practitioners and policy makers in the field for the entire lifecycle of PVE/CVE and De-radicalisation initiatives, from design to evaluation.

INDEED promotes the EU's values and principles; heeding multi-agency and cross-sectoral methods, including gender mainstreaming, societal dimensions and fundamental rights.

1.1 WP2 OVERVIEW

Work Package 2 (WP2) is placed within the heart of the INDEED methodological framework, having a fundamental role in implementing the phases "Identify" and "Involve". Specifically, it will engage with PVE/CVE/ and De-radicalisation practitioners and policy makers as a focal to gather empirical data which will inform the INDEED outputs.

The main objectives of the WP2 are:

1. Engage key first-line practitioners, policy makers (e.g., with the involvement of policy makers from all the relevant levels: EU-level, national-level, but also regional and local authorities) to be involved in the INDEED activities, establish Stakeholder Multisector Anti-Radicalisation Teams (SMART Hubs) and develop a roadmap for repeat engagement throughout the project.
2. Identify gaps in the current designing, planning, implementation and evaluation of policies, strategies, programmes, actions and interventions in use by SMART Hub

¹ The INDEED project defines and uses INITIATIVES as policies and strategies, long term comprehensive programmes, short term actions and ad-hoc interventions.



practitioners - to advance the state of the art in PVE/CVE/ and De-radicalisation /and other security threat preventive measures.

3. Synthesise findings and establish a baseline of core needs, gaps and potential solutions defined by practitioners and policy makers; enabling the development of the next generation of PVE / CVE and De-radicalisation methods.
4. Gather requirements for the most desirable and feasible training and evaluation tools to be developed through the INDEED project; ensuring that the project's outputs are bespoke to the needs of practitioners and policy makers. The results obtained in WP2, coupled with WP1 will be used to develop the EBEM and EBEM-based Evaluation Tool (WP3), conduct evidence-based evaluations (WP4) and the design of training activities (WP5).

The WP2 results will form the foundation for further work in other work packages such as WP3 (Development of the Evidence-Based Evaluation Model (EBEM) for radicalisation prevention and mitigation and an Evaluation Tool dedicated to the PVE/CVE/ and De-radicalisation initiatives), WP4 (Evidence-based evaluation of European, national, regional and local PVE/CVE/ and De-radicalisation initiatives), WP5 (Strengthening Practitioners', Policy makers' Field Competencies for Evidence-based Practice), and WP7 (Communication, Dissemination and Exploitation) amongst others.



2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This deliverable is a synthesis of the data gathered in WP2 and the academic foundation developed by WP1, blending the findings collected across sectors and countries included in this research. The deliverable maps out key challenges and opportunities identified in the research for the next generation of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) and De-radicalisation and other security threat preventive initiatives e.g., policies and strategies, long-term programmes, short-term actions, and ad hoc interventions implemented by the consortium partners and external practitioners and policy makers. The inclusion of SMART Hubs in the activities carried out across the INDEED project facilitates multidisciplinary research and a comparative analysis of the gaps, requirements, and opportunities identified to be comparatively analysed. D2.6 provides the input and basis for the development and design of the Evidence-based Evaluation Model (EBEM) for radicalisation prevention and mitigation (WP3) and the development of e-Guidebook on designing, planning, and implementing evidence-based practice developed in WP5.

This report is divided into three parts. The **first** part provides an analysis of the core needs identified in WP1 and particularly in T2.2 [D2.6] that draws on the practitioners' workshop that was conducted with first-line practitioners and policy makers, representing a wide range of sectors on the 27th – 29th of April 2022 in Athens, Greece. This section progresses with the provision of specific needs to feed into the development and design of the EBEM, the e-Guidebook (WP3), and the training materials developed in WP5. The **second** section of the reports discusses the key requirements in terms of effective P/CVE/DeRAD policy implementation and evaluation amid the fact that addressing violent extremism and radicalisation has been the focus of significant policy and practice for over two decades, leading to increasing P/CVE/ DeRAD initiatives, but with little success to deliver on their objectives. This section identifies the specific and practical requirements needed by the policy makers and practitioners for a more effective P/CVE/ DeRAD initiatives planning, development, implementation, and evaluation. The **third** section of the report concludes the deliverable, providing specific solutions to the gaps and requirements established in the Sections 1 and 2.



3 PART 1: KEY FINDINGS: GAPS IN THE EVALUATION PRACTICES IN PVE/CVE/ DE-RADICALISATION

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This baseline report is a synthesis of the key findings in relation to the gaps, requirements, and solutions identified in WP1, especially in T1.2 (Matrix 1) and WP2. T1.2 provides a solid scientific foundation for the evidence-based practice and evaluation in P/CVE/DeRad as well as the further development of INDEED, supplemented by the gaps, requirements and solutions identified and analysed in T2.2 and T2.3 in multiple ways. **First**, WP1 builds a comprehensive and systematic overview of the evolution of EBP, including of challenges to its implementation, across several disciplines. **Second**, WP1 provides an extensive overview of evaluation designs and their usage in P/CVE/DeRad which offers insights into the development and current state of the field's evidence base. **Third**, the findings of WP1 map out a roadmap for the development of INDEED's EBEM, providing a suitable framework for strengthening EBP in the field of P/CVE/DeRad, and beyond.

WP2 [T2.2 and T2.3] builds on WP1 and the gaps, requirements, and solutions included in this report are gathered under T2.2 and T2.3. T2.2 was delivered through a gap analysis workshop that was conducted with first-line practitioners and policy makers, representing a wide range of sectors on the 27th – 29th of April 2022 in Athens, Greece. The workshop focussed on identifying the current initiatives and evaluation approaches, frameworks, and tools deployed in preventing violent extremism (PVE), countering violent extremism (CVE), De-radicalisation and potentially other security threat preventive initiatives e.g., policies and strategies, programmes, actions, and interventions implemented by the consortium partners and external practitioners and policy makers.

As discussed in D1.2 [Section 3.3.2], there are a range of evaluation designs for primary studies used in the field of P/CVE/De-Radicalisation. It demonstrates the state of evaluation in the field, illustrating that different institutions are using different evaluation approaches, frameworks, and tools in use to evaluate their P/CVE/DeRAD initiatives. It also highlights that the absence of evaluation in the field is widespread across the sectors, underpinned by a range of factors that are discussed in the following sections of this deliverable. The Tables below, drawing on two reviews by Feddes and Galluci (2015/6) and Bellasio et al. (2018) that systematically investigate the usage of different evaluation designs in P/CVE/DeRAD field. Feddes and Galluci (2015/6) reviewed **evaluations of programmes** aimed at preventing radicalisation or de-radicalisation between 1990 and July 2014. Bellasio et al. (2018), in turn, analyzed **evaluations of counterterrorism and P/CVE policies** in the Netherlands and abroad between 2013 and 2017. The studies provide useful indications of the **development of evaluations** between 1990 and 2017, fragmentation of evaluation approaches, frameworks, and tools as well as indicating the absence of EBEM P/CVE/DeRAD initiatives. Selected results of both studies are presented below in tables below (D1.2, pp. 37-38).

Table 1: Prevalence of evaluation designs in PVE/CVE and De-radicalisation between 1990 and June 2014 (based on Feddes and Galluci, 2015/6)

Evaluation design	Number of samples
Cross-sectional design	74
Longitudinal design	5
Quasi-experimental	3



Not specified	50
Mixed design	4
Total	135
Theory-based design	Number of samples
Theory of change included	16
Policy-scientific approach	34
Contribution analysis	1
Realist evaluation	1
No theory-based evaluation	81
Total	133

Table 2: Prevalence of evaluation designs in PVE/CVE and De-radicalisation between 2013 and 2017 (based on Bellasio et al., 2018)

Evaluation design	Number of samples
Additionality (one-time ex-post evaluation, incl. cross-sectional designs)	35
Quasi-experimental designs	8
Longitudinal designs	5
Unclear	3
Total	51
Theory-based design	Number of samples
Theory-based	10
No clear approach	33
Realist evaluation	3
Participatory evaluation	1
Transboundary evaluation	1
Total	48

These studies (Feddes and Galluci, 2015/6; Bellasio et al., 2018), in addition to highlighting interesting trends in the P/CVE/DeRad evaluation literature, also indicate the change in the application of the different evaluation designs over a particular time period. Whilst Bellasio et al. (2018), shows that the popularity of quasi-experimental and longitudinal designs did not notably increase in the period of 2013-2017, quasi-experimental and longitudinal studies conducted between 2013-2017 appear evenly distributed across the studied period. Also, while the variation in the overall number of studies can primarily be attributed to an increase in one-time ex-post evaluations (additionality), there is not any significant shift towards high-quality (impact) evaluation designs in the field of P/CVE/DeRad, as shown in the graph below.




Figure 1: Number of evaluations by design, 2013-2017 (based on Bellasio et al., 2018)

These reviews whilst providing important insights into the state of the P/CVE/DeRAD initiatives' evaluation designs, they are marred by some limitations. The studies do not;

1. Systematically address the extent to which evaluations in P/CVE/DeRad follow stakeholder-oriented designs or engage economic evaluations;
2. Provide information about all the design categories outlined above;
3. Cover developments since 2017 and thus cannot give insights into how the P/CVE/DeRad evaluation landscape has evolved in the past five years;
4. Cover the entire spectrum of evaluations related to P/CVE/DeRad initiatives; and
5. however, they trigger a need for further research in this area, including regular mapping and stocktaking exercises.



To lay a foundation for the analysis of the findings from T2.2, the table below provides a summary of the selected key initiatives, countries, description of the initiatives, evaluation designs, and evaluation methods identified in WP2 [T1.2]. It is important to note that initiatives, countries, and evaluation models presented in the table have been chosen randomly to just highlight the nuances, differences, and state of the P/CVE/DeRAD initiatives evaluations across the EU Member States.

Table 3: Summary of evaluation designs and methods identified in T1.2

Name of Initiative	Country	Description of the initiatives	Evaluation design	Evaluation methods
Decount	Austria	Online campaign providing online resources for extremism prevention and deradicalisation	Quasi-experimental design (pretest-posttest with control group)	Focus group Survey/Questionnaire
DIGITAL STREETS	Austria	Online Streetwork, Social Media Interventions and Digital Youth Work using the example of the project "Jamal al-Khatib - My Way! (lecture/workshop)	Longitudinal (interrupted time series) design	Participant observation, Group discussion, Semi-structured individual interviews
National action plan for the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism 2019-2023	Finland	Objective: describe the joint national strategy guiding the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism and to set out the related objectives and measures	Cross-sectional design (towards the end of the initiative)	Stakeholder interviews (did not include target group), Document analysis
Huolena nuoren radikaloitumisen? (Concerns about radicalisation among the youth?)	Finland	Objective: develop participants' knowledge about violent radicalisation and extremism, as well as knowledge about how to deal with situations in which young people show interest in extremist belief systems.	Cross-sectional (post-initiative) design	Online survey
National Plan to prevent radicalisation (Plan national de prévention de la radicalisation)	France	Protection against radicalised "thinking" - Shielding minds from radicalisation; Widening the detection/prevention network; Understanding and anticipating the evolution of radicalization, preparing for	N.S.	N.S.



<p>developments in radicalisation; Professionalize local stakeholders and evaluate; practices; Tailoring means of disengagement</p>				
EXIT-Germany	Germany	The initiative assists individuals who want to leave the extreme right-wing movement and start a new life	Cross-sectional design	Content and data analysis, Semi-structured interviews
S.E.P.E.A.-Strategic & Operational Plan 2021–2025	Greece	This long-term program consists of 5 strategic priorities. The priority that we are focusing on is: "Fight against serious and organized crime and terrorism". The main objective of this initiative is fighting terrorism, tackling financial support of suspected terrorist and extremist activities, combating radicalization leading to violent extremism and monitoring the phenomenon of returning "foreign fighters".	Repeated cross-sectional design (annual evaluation); Contribution analysis (guided by a theory of change)	Online monitoring tool, document analysis
Safe first grader [unclear connection to P/CVE]	Poland	Road safety; Raising the awareness of elementary school pupils in the field of road safety and promoting appropriate behavior among the youngest road users	N.S.	Knowledge test
"UNDERSTAND=RESP ECT": The Educational Programme Preventing Radicalisation leading to Discrimination and Hate Speech	Poland	The main goal of this initiative is to promote behavior free from all forms of radicalisation, discrimination and hate speech among students and teachers at the 1st High School in Gorzow Wielkopolski (Project Partner), parents and the local environment.	Cross-sectional (pre-initiative) design	Survey and interviews
Back on Track (BOT)	Denmark	The objective is to help radical inmates abandon far-right, far-left or religious extremism by developing and testing	Cross-sectional design	Semi-structured interviews (did not include target group)



		mentoring schemes as a tool to support them.		
Terrorist Wing Vught	Netherlands	The objective is to disengage radicalised Muslims (mainly home-grown jihadi) and right and left-wing extremists from radical movements.	Policy-scientific analysis	Experiments, questionnaire, interviews, document analysis, theory of change
Disengagement and Deradicalisation pilot programme	Turkey	The objective is to persuade members of extremist groups to disengage; change their radical mindsets; and help them reintegrate into society.	Cross-sectional design	Data analysis
Orostelefonen (the Concern hotline), operated by Save the Children Sweden	Sweden	Objective: Providing family support to concerned families whose children are at risk of- or already radicalised to violent extremism.	N.S.	N.S.
Prevent	UK	Prevent is one of the four components of the UK government's counter-terrorism policy – with the aim of preventing people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. The strategy's stated aim is specifically to disrupt, detect, and investigate terrorist activity. For its part, prevent is designed to stop people becoming terrorists, or from supporting terrorism.	Case report design	Case studies, secondary data analysis, personal communications
RoT37	Belgium	The Belgian Coordination Unit for Treat Analysis (CUTA) made a risk assessment tool. The tool takes several risk indicators into account to aid CUTA's experts in making structured professional judgments. It makes it possible to take the necessary measures.	N.S.	N.S.



3.2 BAD PRACTICES IN EVALUATION: A SYSTEMATIC IDENTIFICATION

Understanding the factors that influence the design, implementation, and the effectiveness of an initiative are determined by conceptual confusion, the context/ environment surrounding initiatives, intended outcomes, changing nature of violent extremism, and simplistic models of causation. Likewise, the evaluation of such initiatives is complex, multifactorial, and affected by various gaps and practices. This section identifies and provides a succinct analysis of the main bad practices that impede effective evaluation of the PVE/CVE and De-radicalisation other security threat preventive initiatives (e.g., policies and strategies, long-term programmes, short-term actions, and ad hoc interventions). These bad practices are prevalent across the different sectors, undermine their evaluations, its quality, and impacts.

The table below provides an overview of the key 'bad practices' identified by the practitioners and policy makers who participated in the Practitioners' workshop through a co-creation methodology involving brainstorming, group discussions, world café, and post-workshop survey.

Table 4: Bad practices and their descriptions/explanations

Practices	Descriptions/explanations
Poor planning	Across the sectors, 'poor planning' was a persistent practice that manifested in multiple forms e.g., absence of early planning, insufficient knowledge about the project/ initiative evaluated, inadequate explanation, and a common/ shared language around evaluation within the PVE/CVE and De-radicalisation domains.
Expectations management	Evaluation within the PVE/CVE and De-radicalisation domains lacks a communicative process to enable all stakeholders to engage with the evaluation processes and activities, where expectations and resources are matched feasibly.
Communication and lack of trust	One of the major hurdles in evaluation across the different sectors is the lack of effective communication mechanisms, undermining aspirations for change, impact, and collaboration. A good communication strategy triggers ownership, trust, and meaningful engagement.
Utilisation of results	Lacking utilisation of results is a major evaluation obstacle, whereas the majority of the sectors struggle to foster a culture of understanding, dissemination of results, and long-term change.
Patriarchy	There is a prevalent power asymmetry in the evaluation processes across the sectors, leading to a misconnection between the leadership and the less powerful stakeholders who are mostly responsible for the implementation of initiatives/ programmes.
Control mechanism	The use of 'evaluation as a control mechanism' (e.g., a base for funding) as a widespread practice adversely affects evaluation processes and results.
Politicisation	Evaluation is a complex process that involves different stakeholders with different priorities. This can easily and readily generate conflict of interests, whereas the more powerful party could tilt the process in their



favour. The 'politicisation' of evaluation process and activities undermines their neutrality, independence, and fairness that can ultimately lead to partially/ biased results.

Methodological shortcomings

The lack of effective evaluation methodology, often caused by time and financial pressures, affects the design and implementation of evaluation. In most of the sectors, a methodology is replicated across multiple initiatives without giving due consideration to the context, purpose, and objectives of specific initiatives/ programmes.

3.2.1 PRACTITIONERS' INVOLVEMENT IN EVALUATION PROCESSES AND ACTIVITIES

Any evaluation to meet its objectives and yield the intended results and their sustainability, must be inclusive of all stakeholders responsible for its development, implementation, and utilisation. The data collected in this research reflect that practitioners are not involved in the evaluation processes and activities across different sectors. There is a divide in the development, implementation, and evaluation of PVE/CVE and De-radicalisation and other security threat preventive initiatives e.g., policies and strategies, programmes, actions, and ad-hoc initiatives. As highlighted in Table 1, there is not a universal evaluation model in use across the different sectors, rather institutions implement 'institution-based' evaluations that often lack appropriate methodology and content. In some sectors, evaluations are carried out by external partners who hardly liaise with local members of staff who are evaluated for their performance and expected to implement the evaluation results. This lack of communication/ collaboration between stakeholders often leads to less effective evaluation and a loss of results. In some sectors, institutions lack structured evaluation mechanisms and often conduct ad-hoc and short-term assessment of their performance often conducted by individual practitioners. The results generated by evaluations conducted by practitioners are viewed less valuable in comparison to those gathered through external evaluation results that ultimately take priority over the institution-based [local] evaluation practices and results. Additionally, evaluations conducted by external experts are more likely to influence policy change and strategic planning.

The Table below provides a succinct illustration of the practitioners' involvement in evaluation processes and activities across the EU Member States, drawing on the findings from the WP1, practitioners' workshop, post-workshop, survey, and partners' contributions.

Table 5: An overview of practitioners' involvement in evaluations across EU Member States

Country	Practitioners' involvement
Sweden	In Sweden , most evaluations are commissioned to external experts and do not involve practitioners. The results of such evaluations not always lead to the intended outcomes and are challenging for the local practitioners to implement and sustain.
Belgium	In Belgium , it mostly depends on what exactly 'evaluation' is understood. Whilst in some sectors/ institutions, practitioners' involvement may not be tangible, the police constantly evaluate their work and the methodology to meet the objectives. Additionally, practitioners communicate with different officers at the local level, providing feedback, and collaborating on risk assessment, management and debriefing within evaluation models.



UK	In the UK health sector, evaluation processes are kept very secret. Whilst the effects of certain initiatives are assessed publicly, the results are not made public and at times, practitioners' opinions hardly matter.
Spain	In the policing sector in Spain , police are not involved in the evaluation processes and activities despite working in the field. Evaluations are 'exclusive' and bar practitioners from sharing their experience and contributing to the development and design of programmes they are tasked to implement.
Greece	In Greece the police force, who implement programmes, feels involved at different levels (national, regional, local), and after the implementation periods they look for and assess quantitative and qualitative indicators to gauge their performance.
Bulgaria	In Bulgaria , prison services are involved in the implementation of the PVE/CVE and de-radicalisation initiatives and their evaluation.
Austria	In Austria , practitioners are not involved in evaluations which (if they take place), are often done by people close to the practitioners and governmental organisations.
Germany	In Germany , practitioners' involvement in evaluation processes and activities varies across sectors and jurisdictions. Whilst practitioners from prison services are not involved in evaluations, practitioners in larger federal programmes are involved better in evaluation in evaluation.
Latvia	Practitioners in Latvia are involved in evaluation "only sometimes, but certainly not every time." However, there is an ongoing discussion on effective and holistic evaluation approaches that would involve practitioners.
Finland	P/CVE/ DeRAD initiatives in Finland are evaluated by steering groups that include an institution's members of staff, as well external experts who in addition to facilitating the process contribute as well. The inclusion of an external facilitator provides a space for practitioners to discuss their workload, as well as their plan for improvement. Generally, practitioners are reported to constantly struggle to balance their workload and evaluations.
France	In France , P/CVE/DeRAD initiatives' evaluations are more inclusive and involve practitioners at the local level. Evaluation models/ frameworks encourage practitioners to engage with and contribute to evaluation processes. This horizontal engagement from different stakeholders increases the legitimacy of evaluation results and resist less resistance.

3.2.2 FACTORS UNDERLYING THE ABSENCE OF EVALUATION

The factors that affect evaluation processes (e.g., contexts, stakeholders, priorities, P/CVE/ DeRAD landscapes) are becoming increasingly nuanced and complex across the sectors. This reflects the growing recognition for reflecting the factors that draw people into violent extremism for different reasons and follow different pathways, and that in each initiative and evaluation due consideration must be given to these nuances. However, models and frameworks for the evaluation of P/CVE/ DeRAD initiatives are sometimes, in some sectors, based on factors that underpin organisational priorities, cultures, objectives, and operational requirements. The needs-driven evaluation models and frameworks bar an evaluation that acknowledges, reflects, and addresses the multi-level complexity of evaluation within a particular sector. Additionally,



evaluation is sometimes an unwelcome organisational requirement/ practice that underline the absence of evaluation across the different sectors which include mainly:

Table 6: Key factors underlying the absence of evaluation

Factors	Descriptions/explanations
Political will	Support for evaluation at the management/ leadership level determines evaluation across the sectors. Support for evaluation dictates the direction, objectives, and the results that evaluation seeks to achieve in a specific organisation.
Managing change	An evaluation aims to bring in change which is often resisted at various levels across an institution. Some organisations would view evaluation results/ change undermine their reputation; thus, evaluation models need to incorporate mechanisms that help foster a culture that welcomes change and uses it for improvement.
Inadequate knowledge	As highlighted in the Table of Bad Practices, most of the sectors included in this research fail to provide accurate, timely, and adequate knowledge about an evaluation prior to its implementation. This leads to confusion, inappropriate methodology, and weak collaboration amongst stakeholders. A well-informed evaluation garners support for evaluation and utilisation of results.
Financial resources	Not all institutions allocate designated budget for evaluation that is necessary for the implementation of evaluations and can lead to the lack of expert staff and financial resources. There is a call for designated budget for evaluations across all sectors to facilitate evaluation, its independence.
Technical expertise	LEAs/practitioners and policy makers lag the technological innovations that terrorist groups exploit for their activities. P/CVE/DeRAD stakeholders require technical capacity and human resources to monitor the changing nature of violent extreme and design initiatives and evaluation models that correspond to this situation.
Procedural complexity	Designing and implementing P/CVE/DeRAD initiatives is often a complex task, owing to the complex context in which extreme violence takes hold. This complexity often translates into procedural complexity in designing and implementing P/CVE/DeRAD evaluations.



4 PART 2: KEY FINDINGS: REQUIREMENTS

4.1 A BETTER APPROACH ADDRESSING RADICALISATION AND EXTREMISM

Addressing violent extremism and radicalisation has been the focus of significant policy and practice for over two decades, leading to increasing P/CVE/ DeRAD initiatives. However, these initiatives are at times criticised for failing to deliver on their objectives, with little understanding how and why programmes work or do not work. Research carried out in WP1 and WP2 indicates that the changing terrorism/ violent radicalisation landscapes across the EU Member States, little insights about the initiatives and evaluations' contexts impede planning, design, and evaluation of initiatives. The results from this research in addition to identifying specific requirements to better address violent extremism and facilitate P/CVE/De-RAD initiatives' evaluation, suggests that all efforts must be 'universal', 'coherent', and systematic for long-term result. The figure below is an illustration of the main approaches, followed by specific, practical, and evidence-based requirements illustrated in Figure 1.




Figure 2: A high-level demonstration of main approaches to addressing violent extremism




Figure 3: Specific-level view of the approaches to better address violent extremism/radicalisation

Drawing on the definition of EBE described in WP1 (Section 4.2), and looking at the how and the what (requirements), the foundation upon which the implementation and effectiveness of evaluations are dependent, is **time**. LEAs are overwhelmed, not only in the field of P/CVE/DeRAD, but in many other fields as well, where EBE is also important. LEAs must be working at the front-line, not in offices conducting research. In bridging the gap, a major requirement that could determine evaluation is that the different roles are put clearly. Whilst in some sectors, external evaluations are not viewed with favour, some practitioners suggest that it is helpful to engage an external evaluator to conduct the EBE and present the results and allow the multidisciplinary meeting to engage in the necessary change management that might go along with it.

The EBEM developed by the INDEED project will echo the specific stakeholders or end-users' requirements across different sectors. The requirements identified in this deliverable, as well as in D2.4 and D2.5 will help the design, development, and implementation of P/CVE/De-RAD initiatives and their evaluations in a more effective way. These requirements provide the foundation to establish the key features of the EBEM, the e-Guidebook, and the training materials including the type of the service they will provide, the scope of the service delivery, as well as map out the needs, wants and interests of the stakeholders, particularly the end-users. Additionally, these specific requirements from specific stakeholders/ end-users and other resources e.g. academic enable the development activities to identify and prioritise the most effective ways of building system features which can satisfy and deliver the key objectives of policy development and evaluation in a specific sector or organisation in a more sustained way. A system built on specific requirements from specific stakeholders is key to mitigating the occurrence or recurrence of potential problems for the policy makers and practitioners, as well as institutions that are tasked to address violent extremism or radicalisation.

4.1.1 COMPETENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR EFFECTIVE EVALUATIONS

Competency requirements for effective evaluations are seen as the basis for standards and features that specify the level of abilities, skills, and knowledge required for successful delivery of results in an institution. Competency requirements also serve a key role in enabling an



institution in assessing its success, by identifying the main gaps and offering ground for both proven skills and proven knowledge. Below are the main competency requirements identified in this research to feed into the design and development of the evaluation model aimed at enabling practitioners and policy makers in the development and evaluations of PVE/CVE/ De-radicalisation and potentially other security threat preventive initiatives e.g., policies and strategies, programmes, actions, and ad-hoc interventions.

Inclusion of practitioners and policy makers – currently, as highlighted in WP1, the development and evaluations of P/CVE/ DerRAD initiatives are less inclusive, and marred by a lack of a sense of ownership/ control, inability of evaluation models onboard new users easily, and customise institutional needs and workflow.

Investment in developing expertise at various levels – strategic investments in technical and human expertise/skills and generating knowledge determine the evaluation processes, activities, and utilisation of results. A combination of skills [e.g. social, cultural, training, knowledge, experience] mitigates stakeholders' competency requirements/ gaps and create a culture of evaluation within or across institutions/sectors.

A cultural shift in the broader evaluation perspective and approach – for evaluations to lead to optimal results, a coherent approach grounded in 'qualitative' research is needed to dissect the political, social, economic, and cultural factors that lead to radicalisation. Qualitative evaluation is better able to map out the 'pull and push' factors of radicalisation and crimes, and its results are easier to implement. Qualitative evaluations are more robust compared to the more rigid and figure-based quantitative research. Additionally, qualitative evaluations are more inclusive.

Tools to help with early planning – intuitive, high-level project planning that features collaboration across teams, better stakeholder management, and allows for a flexibility to customise institutional needs/ requirements enhances competency requirements. A good planning increases communication between diverse teams set to deliver different objectives, and an evaluation model that brings all these features in one ecosystem is key to effective, as well as ideal evaluations. Early planning also enhances visibility and helps utilise resources at 100 percent.

Attitudes and social competence – evaluation is not dependent on technology, figures, and statistics alone. It is more a social and cultural process and requires social competence, including social, emotional, cognitive, and behavioural skills needed for successful social adaptation. Social attitudes and social competence foster an ability to take a holistic approach concerning a situation, learn from past experiences, and apply that learning to the changes in social interactions e.g. policy development and evaluations.

Figure 4 Overview of competency requirements



5 PART 3: KEY FINDINGS: SOLUTIONS

5.1.1 IMPROVING EVALUATION APPROACHES, FRAMEWORKS AND TOOLS

The need for evaluation approaches, frameworks, and tools that conceptualise and provide solutions to gaps and needs in initiatives aimed at addressing violent extremism have become increasingly nuanced. This reflects the lack of evaluation models across different sectors that are robust and universal and enable practitioners to adapt them to their needs/requirements. Also, this reflects the growing recognition that such initiatives follow different pathways in terms of development, implementation, and evaluation. However, as highlighted in D1.2 and D2.4 primarily, most of the existing P/CVE/DeRAD evaluation approaches, frameworks, and tools are grounded in conceptualisations or typologies of initiatives or activities specific organisations implement. Such evaluation approaches, frameworks, and tools lack the features that acknowledge and can address the multi-level complexity of P/CVE/DeRAD development and evaluation. This section provides practical solutions to feed into the development of the EBEM, e-Guidebook and the training materials. The solutions include:

Table 7: An illustration of the key solution suggested by practitioners

Professional training – the call for professional development for staff through education, training, and support opportunities whilst becoming increasingly diverse, reflect the diverse evaluation needs/requirements within a specific institution. Thus, solutions to mitigate these needs/ requirements, must be tailored to enable evaluators to relate their evaluations to the users' needs. These trainings could include higher/continuing/education courses/programmes, pre-service training, in-service training, mentoring programmes/courses, and ongoing informal resources.

Early planning – effective, early in evaluation leads to improved performance in terms of cost, operations, balancing the competing needs of the process. Additionally, early planning helps stakeholders to identify their needs, draw a roadmap for a timely implementation of their activities, and allocate their resources accurately.

Simplifying the evaluation processes – the main aim driving an evaluation's process and activities is to help understand a complex reality. Traditional evaluations, as highlighted in D1.2 and D2.4, have limitations when it comes to understanding that reality. Evaluation must go beyond than just assessing a tangled set of relationships or related factors, rather highlight changes and their sustenance.

Independence and inclusivity – evaluation is more constructive when it is independent and inclusive, end-user oriented, and involve experts. Additionally, consulting stakeholders' needs and building a strong sense of ownership and responsibility between stakeholders can significantly improve evaluation approaches, frameworks, and tools.

Secure data sharing – evaluation is a sensitive process and involves different stakeholders and types of data, often undermined by a lack of trust. A mechanism for secure information sharing at all stages of evaluation and implementing its results is crucial for improving evaluation. A more robust data circulation/sharing system leads to stronger partnerships with agencies and actors responsible for change within the field.

Communication – as reflected in Section 3.2, communication that involves evaluators, practitioners/ end-users at various levels is crucial for improving the outcome and the quality of evaluation, and for encouraging a sense of ownership and participation. Persistent communication at various stages of evaluation leads to enhanced transparency and trust.



Empowering stakeholders at lower levels – practitioners and end-users play a crucial part in making an evaluation a success story – promoting low-level evaluations empowers those who are often excluded from the policy making processes but are responsible for implementing them. A top-down evaluation approach often leads to distrust, undermining the evaluation features that should be inclusive, trustworthy, and collaborative.

Utilisation of evaluation results – as documented in D1.2, in striving to contribute towards improved P/CVE/DeRAD initiatives/ outcomes, policymaking institutions create and accumulate huge volumes of related but often underutilised data. An ideal evaluation process includes as its constitutive activities necessary for the dissemination and utilisation of evaluation results in the policymaking processes.

Designated budget – in addition to the political and cultural limitations, financial limitations adversely impact evaluation processes and activities in multiple ways. Most of the institutions do not include designated budget or funding to evaluation, pushing evaluations further down the list of priorities and undermining institutional confidence [financial] to plan and conduct evaluations in an ideal way. The EBEM will be very welcome if it reduces dependency on 'extra' budget.

5.1.2 IMPROVING POLICY AND PRACTICES: SYSTEMIC APPROACH TO LEARNING, IMPLEMENTING CHANGE, AND UTILISING EVALUATION RESULTS

A change and improvement in policy requires sustained efforts and investment to ensure sustainability, long-term impact, and effective implementation. The research carried out with practitioners suggests some concrete recommendations necessary for improving policy and practices, as well as for enhancing learning, implementing change, and utilising evaluation results.




Figure 5 An overview of the systematic approach to improving policy and change

The tables below provide some specific suggestions/solutions for a more effective learning, implementing change, and utilising evaluation results.

Table 8: Improving policy and practices

Learning	Implementing change	Utilising evaluation results
<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Developing new subjects in trainings2. Sharing results/ data with affected groups3. Include a proper understanding/ concept of evaluations4. Demystifying evaluations5. Doing clear introduction in every training to the need of evaluation	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Updating training curricula2. Continuation of trainings for long-term implementation3. Feedback circles4. Raise awareness of evaluations	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Updating policies and strategies2. Changing assumptions of programmes3. Inclusive designing and planning phases4. Early planning about dissemination5. Target the right audience

5.1.3 KEY FEATURES OF AN IDEAL EVALUATION

Research carried out in WP1 and WP2 suggest that evaluation within the P/CVE/DeRAD domains lacks approaches, frameworks, and tools that can differentiate between the dimensions of violent extremism and P/CVE/DeRAD initiatives' evaluation, include the fundamentals of evaluation



processes and activities, identify factors that affect outcomes, and relate to the varying policy and evaluation contexts. There is a call that tends toward a search for a universal EBEM that, in evaluating P/CVE/DeRAD initiatives in complex social contexts can address complexity and variability. Any evaluation approach, framework, or tool to relate to the changing P/CVE/ DeRAD contexts, according to the policy makers and practitioners with responsibility for a social problem, should avoid the general question 'what works?', rather should identify what works where, for whom, and how? Below are the main components of an ideal evaluation, identified by the practitioners, to address the social, cultural, technical, and financial differences that influence evaluation processes and activities across different sectors.

1. **Respecting differences** – the evaluation of a sensitive issue such as violent extremism requires a mechanism that is inclusive and sensitive to differences within an institution that respects differences and views them as a source of strength. A good evaluation involves plannings, roadmaps, and indicators that enable specific institutions to adapt their evaluation frameworks or tools suitable to their organisational needs.
2. **Avoiding rigid structures** – since addressing violent extremism requires dynamic and flexible initiatives to suit varying contexts, evaluations too due to cultural, social, and financial prerequisites or dimensions must be flexible to allow/ enable the relevant stakeholders to engage, interact, and contribute to evaluation processes. Exercising rigidity in evaluation processes denies an opportunity to change practices and sustain change results, by undermining the culture of trust grounded in team spirit.
3. **Building cross-sector coherence** – the responsibility to develop and implement P/CVE/ DeRAD initiatives is delegated to different sectors, and at times, some sectors e.g. education and health are mandated to implement such initiatives. But there is little synchronisation of policy development and implementation across different sectors. Likewise, the evaluations of such initiatives are not carried out in synchronisation with other sectors or even institutions within a specific sector.
4. **Synchronising evaluation approaches, frameworks, and tools** – as highlighted above, the lack of a connection between sectors and institutions dealing with P/CVE/DeRAD initiatives development and implementation causes to a disconnection between evaluation approaches, frameworks, and tools as well. A lack of synchronisation within the evaluation undermines a culture of sustained and effective evaluation.
5. **Standard language** – evaluation of P/CVE/DeRAD initiatives is marred with the language used to design and implement evaluations, whereas practitioners often lack the technical skills to understand evaluation requirements, design procedures that suit all stakeholders, and develop methodology that is easy to use in varying contexts. In some sectors or institutions, the language used in evaluations is sometimes not relevant to the objectives of the evaluations, their end-users, where they need to use translators or interpreters.
6. **Inclusivity** – for an initiative or implementation process to achieve its objectives, it must function as the fabric of belonging, foster a feeling of belonging, and must be able to weave an inclusive culture. Inclusive organisations have higher-performing, sustainable evaluation culture.
7. **Process** – for an evaluation to achieve its intended objectives, it must be designed and implemented as a process and a roadmap that includes specific objectives, activities, and resources. Additionally, evaluations must be designed and implemented in accordance with specific initiatives, as different initiatives demonstrate their results at varying time-scales.

To conclude this section, an analysis of the data gathered in WP1 and WP2, for evaluations to meet their objectives, they must recognise and reflect in their development and implement the following key issues/areas:




Figure 6 An overview of the key features of an ideal evaluation



6 CONCLUSIONS

This is a baseline report on the core gaps, requirements, and solutions to feed into the development of the EBEM and e-Guidebook, as well the training kits to help practitioners conduct evaluations in a more effective way. This report draws on the findings from a workshop conducted with practitioners to identify gaps and requirements prevalent across different sectors. The aim of the workshop was to identify PVE/CVE/De-radicalisation and other security threat and preventative initiatives e.g., policies and strategies, long-term programmes, short-term actions, and ad hoc interventions and their evaluation approaches, frameworks, and tools implemented by the consortium partners and external practitioners and policy makers.

The results suggest that violent extremism or radicalisation is growing in complexity as extremist actors exploit several spaces e.g., schools and social media sites, by taking advantage of technological resources. States across the EU are responding in numerous ways with the aim of challenging social, economic, ideological, and political factors. The findings suggest that although there is a demand for "innovative" and "moving" approaches to fight against violent extremism or radicalisation in a variety of settings, there is a lack of clarity on meanings and implications of radicalisation regarding violent extremism, public awareness, inclusion of local communities, trust between stakeholders, and investment in the development and application of new means of communication and data sharing.

Within the evaluation of PVE/CVE/De-radicalisation initiatives there is a widespread divide in the implementation of evaluation across organisations and sectors preventing practitioners from engaging in all stages, evaluation processes and activities. Evaluation is mixed with risk assessment/management/debriefings as opposed to systematic and professional evaluation. There is a widespread absence of evaluation across sectors and jurisdictions due to numerous factors including political will, resistance to change, lack of knowledge, financial resources, technical expertise, and procedural complexity. The evaluation processes and activities within the PVE/CVE/De-radicalisation and crime prevention domains are tarnished with several "bad practices", including poor planning, expectations management, poor communication, unsuccessful utilisation of evaluation results, patriarchy, politicisation of evaluation, and methodological shortcomings.

These findings highlight systemic approaches to learning, implementing change, and utilising evaluation results for improving policy and practice. Change and improvement in policy requires continuous efforts and investment to ensure sustainability, long-term impact, and effective implementation.



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